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A short introduction in behavioral economics  
People are faced with numerous decisions every day. Whether we must choose our outfit for the 
day, which cell phone brand to buy, what college to attend, to buy a car or house insurance, or 
even when or to whom to get married, decisions are a permanent presence in our daily activities. 
Behavioral economics is a multi-disciplinary field of study investigating how people make 
judgments and decisions (Camerer & Loewenstein, 2004; Heilman, 2014). Even though, from a 
historic point of view, behavioral economics is considered to be a relatively young field of 
research, the large number of studies that were undertaken and their theoretical and practical 
implications have made the field of behavioral economics increasingly visible among scholars. 
More importantly, they have also facilitated contexts to transform behavioral results into social 
policy programs. Starting in 2010, the UK goverment launched the Behavioral Insights Team, also 
known as The Nudge Unit, which was then followed by the Social and Behavioral Sciences Team 
(SBST), established by the Obama administration in 2014. Both teams aim to apply behavioral 
sciences, including behavioral economics, in governmental programs in order to increase people’s 
quality of life at lower costs. The efforts of the Nudge Unit and the SBST or other agencies and 
individual researchers who are trying to improve people’s overall quality of life should be 
supported by the research community through relevant scientific projects and by constantly finding 
new ways to capitalize research derived knowledge for the general use of a community.    
The Ultimatum Game 
A large proportion of behavioural economics studies rely on various economic games, which have 
the advantage to depict a decisional situation in a simplified form. The Ultimatum Game (UG, 
Güth et al., 1982) is a decision-making task that illustrates a negotiation scenario. The standard 
UG involves two players. The first player, also known as the proposer, has the task of dividing a 
certain amount of money with a second player, called the responder. The responder can choose to 
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accept or reject the received offer. Should the responder accept the offer, the money is divided 
between the two players per the proposer’s offer. However, if the responder decides to reject the 
offer, then neither player gets any money. Most frequently, when participating in an UG task, both 
players are informed regarding the rules of the game, the amount of money that is to be shared and 
the consequences of their possible actions (Güth & Kocher, 2014). Based on two economic 
assumptions, namely participants’ rationality and their interest in maximizing their gain (Camerer 
& Fehr, 2006), the normative solution for the UG would be for the proposer to send the minimum 
possible amount to the responder. For the responder, it would be expected to accept any non-zero 
amount. Nevertheless, both players behave in a significantly different manner compared to the 
normative behaviour. More specifically, it was found that most proposers offer a larger proportion 
of the pie to share, approximately 50% of the total amount. Also, responders’ behaviour deviates 
from normative expectations because lower offers, of 20% or less of the total amount, are rejected 
by most participants (Camerer, 2003).  
The UG triggers two conflicting reasons that could guide players’ behavior. On one hand, 
normative decisional theories would argue that decision-makers are rational and self-interested, 
motivated to maximize their gain. Although some people, in certain specific situations, behave 
rational in the UG, most of the times proposers and responders seem to be guided by some other 
motive than self-maximization. Judgements of fairness and intentions behind the money allocation 
decisions are frequently invoked (Loewenstein, Thompson & Bazerman, 1989). There is 
converging behavioral and neuroimaging data that indicates that people engage in fairness 
judgements (Brosnan, 2011), due to a concern for reciprocity (Rabin, 1993) or inequity aversion 
(Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Tricomi, Rangel, Camerer & O’Doherty, 2010). Therefore, studies suggest 
people might have an innate sense of fairness that guides their behavior in social interactions and 
division of a benefit.             
Based on the behavioural results obtained playing the UG, the task has established itself as one of 
the most powerful tools that highlight the limitations of the normative models of decision-making. 
Since it was first introduced, the UG has been played in hundreds of experimental studies, with 
numerous methodological variations (Güth & Kocher, 2014). 
Many scholars have advanced different theories in their efforts to explain the behavioural pattern 
in the UG and why the economic normative predictions are violated. Their endeavour opened the 
possibility to investigate many variables, including methodological modifications, individual 
differences or even cultural background. A thorough presentation of all these variables is beyond 
the scope of this paper (for further reading on this topic, Güth & Kocher, 2014). However, of 
particular interest for the research community and directly related to this topic are studies that have 
associated gender differences (Eckel & Grossman, 2001; Solnick, 2001) with decisions related to 
how much money to send to the responder or when an offer is accepted or rejected.  
In spite of the fact that there are many experimental studies related to the UG and how people 
allocate resources among them, the game’s applicability in more ecological environments is less 
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well investigated. Carpenter, Burks and Verhoogen (2005) show that there are no significant 
behavioral differences between UG allocation of college students compared to workers, providing 
empirical evidence for the external validity of the UG.  However, scholars speculate that decision-
makers’ preferences in the UG might also reflect behavioural differences in real life situations, 
such as salary negotiations, but direct evidence is missing.  
The gender pay gap 
There is an increasing number of studies that show the existence of a gender pay gap, providing 
systematic proof that, on average, men are paid more than women (Ge, Kankanhalli, & Huang, 
2015; Joshi, Son & Roh, 2015; Webber & Canche, 2015). It has been estimated that women are 
paid 23% less compared to their male colleagues, and the pay gap might be even higher for Afro-
Americans or Latino minorities (Joshi, Son & Roh, 2015). Even looking at people pursuing 
doctoral studies in different domains (Webber & Canche, 2015) or people working in the fast-
developing field of IT (Ge, Kankanhalli, & Huang, 2015;) there is a significant salary difference 
favoring men. Studies show that some of these differences might be due to the fact that women 
avoid salary negotiations (Eckel, De Oliveira & Grossman, 2008; Leibbrandt & List, 2014), or to 
gender related stereotypes (Fabre, Causse, Pesciarelly & Cacciari, 2016; Reuben, Sapienza & 
Zingales, 2014).    
The decisional situation depicted by the UG could be used to test and investigate the factors that 
contribute to the fact that women are offered less and accept lower salaries than men, while keeping 
constant the education and professional training levels, total number of working hours during a 
week or similar job requirements. In a nutshell, the decision to accept a job for a certain salary is 
similar to the responder’s decision in the UG to accept an offer.  
Can behavioral economics provide useful insights and research tools to reduce the gender 
pay gap? 
UG studies have looked at gender differences in offers that are made and accepted/rejected. Most 
studies indicate that women are offered less compared to men and also that women have higher 
acceptance rates, including for unfair offers (Eckel & Grossman, 2001; Eckel, De Oliveira & 
Grossman, 2008; Solnick, 2001; Solnick & Schweitzer, 1999). So far, we can only speculate that 
UG behaviour could be related to real life salary decisions. Future studies should take upon the 
challenge to directly test if there is an association between the two decisional contexts and to what 
extend UG results could be informative outside the laboratory setting. If systematic research could 
prove an association between people’s behaviour in the UG and real life decisional behaviour, 
such as salary negotiation, scholars could connect the two investigative topics with mutual 
scientific benefits. That is, individual differences that have been associated with decisions in the 
UG might be investigated if they could also account for the fact that women are offered lower 
salaries and they usually accept lower payments than men. Various social policies or 
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organizational practices regarding salary allocations for men and women could profit from this 
scientific cross-fertilization in order to remedy a current discriminating situation.    
Until present date, the field of behavioural economics has produced an impressive number of 
studies regarding our decision-making. Moreover, behavioural economics is already trying to 
provide useful data that can create or help implement a large variety of social programs designed 
to increase quality of life. Building on past success, new studies should be designed to further 
bridge the gap between theory and practice.       
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